Governor Seyi Makinde’s presentation of the ₦1.115 trillion 2027 Budget of Sustained Progress to the Oyo State House of Assembly on Tuesday November 10 offers an opportunity to examine more than the financial priorities of an outgoing administration. It also raises fundamental questions about the quality of legislative oversight, the accountability of public expenditure and the institutional capacity of the state to protect the interests of its people.
Three areas deserve particular attention: agriculture, capital expenditure and the financial obligations that will be inherited by the next administration.
The proposed budget allocates ₦670.03 billion, representing approximately 60.07 per cent, to capital expenditure, while recurrent expenditure accounts for ₦445.31 billion. On paper, this appears to demonstrate a preference for infrastructure and development. However, a budget is fundamentally a statement of intention, not evidence of achievement. The more important question is whether the administration can demonstrate that previous capital appropriations have translated into completed projects, measurable improvements and tangible benefits for the people.
This is where the responsibility of the House of Assembly becomes particularly important. Its duty is not simply to receive the Governor’s budget speech, examine the estimates and proceed to approval. It must interrogate the assumptions behind the proposals, demand supporting documentation and establish whether the administration’s claims are consistent with its actual performance. A legislature that does not sufficiently question executive projections risks reducing budget scrutiny to a procedural exercise.
Agriculture provides a particularly revealing example. Despite the administration’s emphasis on agribusiness transformation and the presentation of the Fasola Agribusiness Transformation Centre as a major achievement, the sector receives approximately ₦23.85 billion, representing just 2.14 per cent of the proposed ₦1.115 trillion budget. The Governor has cited investments exceeding ₦20 billion in the Fasola project, the participation of 16 agribusinesses, more than 1,000 direct and indirect jobs and over 30,000 biometrically registered farmers. These are significant claims, but they should invite further scrutiny rather than automatic applause.
The Assembly ought to demand a clearer explanation of how the proposed allocation will translate into improved agricultural productivity, expanded access to finance, irrigation, storage facilities, processing capacity, rural infrastructure and better incomes for farmers. How many farmers have experienced measurable improvements in their livelihoods? What is the scale of agricultural output attributable to the administration’s interventions? What proportion of the sector’s challenges will the proposed allocation realistically address? These are legitimate questions for legislators charged with protecting public interest.
The contradiction is not necessarily that the administration has done nothing in agriculture, but that the scale of its budgetary commitment must be tested against the scale of its development claims. If the legislature does not insist on this relationship between political promises, financial provisions and measurable outcomes, who will? The watchdog function of the Assembly becomes meaningless when government narratives are accepted without adequate examination.
The same concern applies to capital expenditure. A proposed capital allocation of ₦670.03 billion is substantial, but the people of Oyo State are entitled to know how previous appropriations have performed. Which projects have been completed, which remain ongoing and which have experienced delays or cost variations? What amounts were approved, released and actually expended? The Assembly should not merely consider the new budget in isolation; it should examine it against the record of previous budgets and insist on a credible project-by-project performance report.
This is particularly important because the legislature is constitutionally empowered to scrutinise public expenditure and hold the Executive accountable. Its responsibility extends beyond approving estimates to ensuring that appropriated funds are applied for the purposes for which they were approved. Yet, where the political relationship between the Executive and the legislature creates a public perception that the latter is more inclined to accommodate than challenge the former, the credibility of the entire accountability process becomes questionable.
That concern leads to a deeper problem in our political recruitment process. When the selection and emergence of political representatives are perceived to depend more on executive patronage, party loyalty and political accommodation than on legislative independence, competence and courage, the institution may struggle to discharge its constitutional responsibilities effectively. This is not an allegation against the personal integrity of individual lawmakers. It is a question about whether the political system consistently produces representatives with the independence to challenge those who exercise executive power. A legislature cannot be an effective watchdog if its political incentives discourage it from barking.
The third issue is the transition implication of the 2027 budget. Governor Makinde has acknowledged that his administration will implement only part of the budget before leaving office on May 29, 2027, leaving the incoming administration to implement the remaining portion. This arrangement makes legislative scrutiny even more urgent. The Assembly must establish precisely what financial and contractual commitments the outgoing government intends to leave behind and what room will remain for its successor to determine its own priorities.
A responsible transition requires full disclosure of ongoing projects, outstanding contractor payments, unpaid certificates, loans, counterpart funding obligations, contractual liabilities and the recurrent costs attached to newly established institutions and infrastructure. Without such information, the incoming government could inherit commitments whose financial implications are not immediately apparent. The House should therefore demand a transparent transition schedule before approving a budget that will extend beyond the tenure of the government presenting it.
There is also a broader democratic question. A state budget belongs to the people, not to the administration that prepares it. While lawful commitments must be respected, an incoming government should not be placed in a position where its policy choices are substantially predetermined by an outgoing administration without adequate public scrutiny. The legislature has a responsibility to ensure that continuity does not become a convenient instrument for restricting the policy freedom of the next government.
Unfortunately, these concerns return us to the fundamental weakness of legislative oversight. If the House of Assembly is unable or unwilling to demand explanations on agricultural priorities, insist on evidence of capital project performance and scrutinise the liabilities attached to a transition budget, then the problem goes beyond the quality of the Governor’s proposals. It raises questions about the effectiveness of the institution established to provide checks and balances. The constitutional separation of powers is not meant to be ceremonial; it is designed to prevent the concentration of public power without accountability.
Ultimately, the 2027 budget should be judged by three tests: whether its agricultural provisions match the administration’s development claims, whether its capital expenditure is supported by verifiable performance and whether its transition arrangements protect the financial and policy interests of Oyo State. But there is a fourth test that is equally important: whether the House of Assembly has the independence and courage to ask the difficult questions. The true test of sustained progress is not how much an outgoing government promises to spend, but what it delivers, what it leaves behind and whether the institutions entrusted with public accountability have the independence to demand answers.
Ultimately, the 2027 budget should be judged not only by its agricultural provisions, capital expenditure and transition arrangements, but also by the willingness of the House of Assembly to demand answers from the Executive. This brings the discussion to the broader political implications of Omititun 3.0 and the proposed continuity of the Makinde administration beyond its constitutionally permitted tenure. The electorate must interrogate whether this promise of continuity represents a genuine commitment to sustaining development or a political arrangement that could effectively produce a third term by proxy, preserve the influence of the outgoing administration and make an independent assessment of its record more difficult. A change of occupant at the Government House means little if the governing philosophy, political loyalties and accountability structures remain substantially unchanged.
Oyo State should therefore approach the 2027 election with caution and critically examine the APM platform, its relationship with the outgoing administration and what its proposed continuity means for democratic accountability. The state deserves a government with the independence to review inherited decisions, expose shortcomings where necessary and pursue policies in the public interest without being constrained by the political interests of its predecessor.
Oyo people must decide whether they want another chapter of the existing political arrangement or a genuinely independent alternative committed to accountability, institutional integrity, and a new direction for the state.
Prince Armstrong-Bello, JP. Akogun Aliiwo, Ibadanland is a Political Communication Strategist and Public Affairs Analyst.
